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ii. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. 
Is the decision of the panel of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
retaining jurisdiction over the issue of custody of the parties' 
minor children despite the fact that the mother has moved from 
this state with the children, in conflict with a decision of the 
Supreme Court. 
II. 
Has the Utah Court of Appeals, in holding that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in retaining jurisdiction over 
the issue of the custody of the parties' minor children despite 
the fact that the mother has moved from this state with the 
children, decided an important question of municipal, state or 
federal law which the Supreme Court should but has not decided. 
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
In a decision dated April 15, 1988 the panel of the Utah 
Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the order of the trial court 
denying Plaintiff's petition to transfer jurisdiction to 
Washington State under the provisions of the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act. 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah State Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-2 (3)(a). 
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Respondent filed a motion for an extension of time to file a 
brief in reply the petition for writ of certiorari. An order 
dated July 22, 1988 granted an extension of time to August 16, 
1988. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
The controlling provisions, Utah Code Annotated, Sections 
78-45C-1 et. seq. and Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-5, are set 
forth in the appendix hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Wendy Rawlings (Rawlings) appealed from the 
district court's modification of her divorce decree, claiming the 
trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the decree because of 
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), in effect in 
both Utah and Washington. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the 
decision of the trial court. Plaintiff now seeks a writ of 
certiorari in the Supreme Court. 
Defendant Mark Weiner (Weiner) and Rawlings were married 
August 16, 1974, in Manti, Utah. The parties had five children as 
issue of their marriage. The parties were divorced on May 18, 
1982, by the Honorable Omer J. Call of the First District Court of 
Box Elder County, Utah. The original decree was later amended on 
September 27, 1982, by Judge Call. Rawlings was awarded custody 
of the parties1 five children while Weiner was awarded carefully 
enunciated visitation rights with the minor children. In December 
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1982, Rawlings remarried. 
From 1982 to 1984 Weiner initiated several proceedings to 
enforce the visitation order in the divorce decree, and each time 
the judge ordered the parties to comply with the order. 
In June 1984, Rawlings sent a letter to Weiner informing him 
that she and the children had moved to "the Des Moines area" and 
could be reached at a Utah post office box. Rawlings moved to 
Washington in June of 1984. During the summer of 1984, Weiner 
initiated several additional proceedings in an attempt to locate 
his children. 
In October 1984, another hearing was held and the court found 
that Rawlings1 move constituted a substantial change in 
circumstances allowing modification of the visitation provisions 
in the divorce decree. 
In April 1985, a shelter care hearing was held in Washington, 
pursuant to emergency jurisdiction provided for in the Washington 
UCCJA, to determine allegations of child abuse made by Rawlings 
against Weiner. Commissioner Gaddis of the Washington court noted 
that the Washington court orders were temporary and any permanent 
adjudication or realignment of the parties had to come from Utah, 
until the Utah court declined jurisdiction. 
In October 1985, Weiner filed an order to show cause in Utah. 
In November 1985, Rawlings petitioned for transfer of jurisdiction 
from Utah to Washington. Pursuant to Rawlings1 transfer request, 
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Commissioner Gaddis contacted the court in Utah and after 
discussion with Judge Call declined to accept jurisdiction in 
Washington. Commissioner Gaddis urged the Utah court to retain 
jurisdiction to enforce or modify custody and visitation orders. 
On December 23, 1985, Judge Call filed a statement and order 
and certified the matters of disqualification and jurisdiction to 
Judge VeNoy Christoffersen of the First District Court of Utah for 
determination. Judge Christoffersen denied Rawlings' motion to 
disqualify Judge Call, denied the Motion to Change Jurisdiction, 
and set a hearing date in May 1986, for the order to show cause. 
On October 21, 1986, the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
order on the order to show cause were entered by the court. The 
court found Rawlings in contempt for continuing to use ""Rawlings" 
as the children's last name after being ordered not to do so, 
modified the visitation order and ordered that the parties have 
joint custody of the children, with Rawlings maintaining physical 
custody. 
Weiner timely appealed the October 21, 1986 order. Rawlings 
cross-appealed on grounds that the First District Court lacked 
jurisdiction. Weiner1s appeal was dismissed for lack of 
prosecution by order the Court of Appeals on June 9, 1987. The 
panel of the Utah Court of Appeals issued a unanimous decision, 
dated April 15, 1988, affirming the decision of the trial court. 
Plaintiff now seeks a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DECISION OF THE PANEL OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT 
IN CONFLICT WITH A DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT. 
Petitioner asserts that the decision of the panel of the Utah 
Court of Appeals is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme 
Court, specifically Trent v. Trent, 735 P.2d 382 (Utah 1987); and 
that the decision is also contrary to the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act, Utah Code Annotated, Sections 78-45C-1 et.seq. 
Petitioner claims that Trent is applicable only to cases involving 
visitation rights and not to cases involving issues of custody. 
Petitioner asserts that had Trent involved a situation where the 
father was seeking to gain custody of his children, the court 
would have ruled differently. While this may or may not be the 
case, it does not place the holding of the Court of Appeals in 
conflict with this Court's holding in Trent. The holding in Trent 
is that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining 
to relinquish jurisdiction over the the father's action under the 
particular facts of that case which included that the father was 
only seeking to enforce visitation. In this case Weiner filed an 
action seeking custody of the children; however unlike Trent the 
parties' children were born and lived in Utah prior to being taken 
from the State by Rawlings in June of 1984. In addition the Utah 
Court had exercised it jurisdiction over the matter on several 
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occasions following the entry of the initial decree, including to 
modify the decree with respect to visitation after Rawlings had 
moved from the State. And finally in this case Washington State 
had already declined to accept permanent jurisdiction of the 
matter. In Trent there is no indication that Idaho had made any 
determination at all or even that an action had been filed there. 
Although Trent may have dealt exclusively with an issue of 
visitation it is clear from a reading of the case that the 
decision to retain jurisdiction is one in which the trial court 
has discretion and that absent an abuse of that discretion that 
decision will not be overturned. See also Harding v. Harding, 26 
Utah 2d 277, 488 P.2d 308 (1971). In this case there is no record 
of the May 1986 hearing. Absent such a record it must be presumed 
that the trial court which heard the evidence acted correctly. 
Fackrell y^ Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987). The mere fact 
that this case involved an issue of custody does not place it in 
conflict with this Court's decision in Trent. 
The decision of the panel of the Court of Appeals is also not 
in conflict with the provisions of the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act. As noted by the decision of the Court of 
Appeals, the UCCJA does not mandate the loss of jurisdiction to 
the original state in all cases; but only if Utah chooses to 
relinquish jurisdiction based upon the best interests of the 
child, Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45C-3(l). The UCCJA does 
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also not require that the child be physically present in this 
state in order to determine his custody. Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78~45C-3(3). Petitioner argues that because the children 
live outside the state the purposes of the UCCJA are contravened 
by the decision to retain jurisdiction in this state; and yet 
Petitioner does not offer any proof that best interests of the 
child would be better served by relinquishing jurisdiction to the 
State of Washington. Absent such a showing, the decision of the 
trial court and the action of the panel of the Court of Appeals in 
affirming that decision must be presumed correct. It is also 
important to note that Judge Call and the Commissioner from the 
Court in Washington State conferred on the decision as to which 
court should exercise jurisdiction as prescribed by Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 78-45C-7(4). Based upon this conference the 
Washington Court declined to accept jurisdiction. Pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78~45C-3(3)(d)(i) Utah should retain 
jurisdiction if in is in the best interests of the child. Again 
it is clear that Petitioner's argument is not that the trial court 
did not follow the UCCJA; but rather that Petitioner disagrees 
with the court's decision that the best interests of the children 
would be served if Utah retained jurisdiction. And again it is 
noted that Petitioner offers no proof that the trial court abused 
the discretion which it is allowed in making that decision. 
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POINT II. 
THE HOLDING OF THE PANEL OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS HAS 
DECIDED AN ISSUE OF STATE LAW WHICH IS NO DOUBT IMPORTANT; BUT NOT 
ONE WHICH THE SUPREME COURT HAS NOT ALREADY DECIDED. 
There is no doubt that the First District Court has 
jurisdiction to modify the decree of divorce which it entered on 
May 18, 1982. Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-5(3) confers this 
continuing jurisdiction. The provisions of the UCCJA do not 
strip this jurisdiction simply because the mother has moved from 
this state, taking the children with her* The UCCJA provides a 
procedure for the court to follow in determining whether or not to 
relinquish this jurisdiction in favor of another state. Judge 
Call followed this procedure and determined that Washington State 
had declined to accept jurisdiction and that it was in the best 
interests of the children that jurisdiction continue to be 
exercised in Utah. The holding of this court in Trent, supra, is 
that the trial court is vested with the discretion to determine 
whether or not to relinquish jurisdiction in favor of another 
state; and that that decision will not be overturned unless that 
discretion has been abused. Petitioner has offered no evidence 
that Judge Call abused his discretion in making that decision. It 
seems clear that the decision in Trent decided the important issue 
of state law; and that this decision need not be made again by 
this Court. What Petitioner seeks is that this Court add its 
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review to the review of the Court of Appeals. This is simply not 
what is contemplated by Rule 43# Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
The petition for writ of certiorari should be denied. 
DATED this fa & day of August, 1988. 
/,*?/ 
Michael L. Miller 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and exact copies of 
the foregoing to the attorney for the Petitioner, postage prepaid, 
at: 
Stephen W. Jewell, Esq. 
15 South Main, Third Floor 
Logan, Utah 84321 
DATED this //„ & day of August, 1988. 
/&/ 
Carol M. Jones 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
Wendy Marie Christensen Rawlings, 
Plaintiff, Respondent, 
and Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
Mark Douglas Weiner, 
Defendant, Appellant, 
and Cross-Respondent. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 860274-CA 
Before Judges Davidson, Garff and Bench.— 7 ££t^
 r ^ on CC) 
F I L E D 
Tm/omyM Snea 
DAVIDSON, J u d g e : -eierk of me Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Plaintiff Wendy Rawlings (Rawlings) appeals from the 
district court's modification of her divorce decree, claiming 
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the decree 
because of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), 
in effect in both Utah and Washington. We affirm. 
Defendant Mark Weiner (Weiner) and Rawlings were married 
August 16, 1974, in Manti, Utah. The parties had five children 
as issue of their marriage. The parties were divorced on May 
18, 1982, by the Honorable Omer J. Call of the First District 
Court of Box Elder County, Utah. The original decree was later 
amended on September 27, 1982, by Judge Call. Rawlings was 
awarded custody of the parties' five children while Weiner was 
awarded carefully enunciated visitation rights with the minor 
children. In December 1982, Rawlings remarried. 
From 1982 to 1984 Weiner initiated several proceedings to 
enforce the visitation order in the divorce decree, and each 
time the judge ordered the parties to comply with the order.1 
1. All hearings were before Judge Call. The orders on the 
order to show cause enumerated here dealt exclusively with 
compliance of visitation rights. The orders by Judge Call were: 
November 17, 1982; May 16, 1983; February 16, 1984; May 29, 1984 
In June 1984, Rawlings sent a letter to Weiner informing 
him that she and the children had moved to Hthe Des Moines area" 
and could be reached at a Utah post office box. Rawlings moved 
to Washington in June of 1984.2 During the summer of 1984, 
Weiner initiated several additional proceedings in an attempt to 
locate his children.3 
In October 1984, another hearing was held and the court 
found that Rawlings1 move constituted a substantial change in 
circumstances allowing modification of the visitation provisions 
in the divorce decree. 
In April 1985, a shelter care hearing was held in 
Washington, pursuant to emergency jurisdiction provided for in 
the Washington UCCJA, to determine allegations of child abuse 
made by Rawlings against Weiner. Commissioner Gaddis of the 
Washington court noted that the Washington court orders were 
temporary and any permanent adjudication or realignment of the 
parties had to come from Utah, until the Utah court declined 
jurisdiction. 
In October 1985, Weiner filed an order to show cause in 
Utah. In November 1985, Rawlings petitioned for transfer of 
jurisdiction from Utah to Washington. Pursuant to Rawlings* 
transfer request, Commissioner Gaddis contacted the court in 
Utah and after discussion with Judge Call declined to accept 
jurisdiction in Washington. Commissioner Gaddis urged the Utah 
court to retain jurisdiction to enforce or modify custody and 
visitation orders. 
On December 23, 1985, Judge Call filed a statement and 
order and certified the matters of disqualification and 
jurisdiction to Judge VeNoy Christoffersen of the First District 
Court of Utah for determination. Judge Christoffersen denied 
Rawlings1 motion to disqualify Judge Call, denied the Motion to 
Change Jurisdiction, and set a hearing date in May 1986, for the 
order to show cause. On October 21, 1986, the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and order on the order to show cause were 
entered by the court. The court found Rawlings in contempt for 
continuing to use "Rawlings" as the children's last name after 
being ordered not to do so, modified the visitation order and 
ordered that the parties have joint custody of the children, 
with Rawlings maintaining physical custody. 
2. The "Des Moines areaM referred to in the letter turned out 
to be a suburb of Seattle, Washington. 
3. Weiner1s continued attempt to locate his children resulted 
in additional orders by Judge Call on July 26, 1984 and August 
8, 1984. 
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Weiner timely appealed the October 21/ 1986 order. 
Rawlings cross-appealed on grounds that the First District Court 
lacked jurisdiction. Weiner1s appeal was dismissed for lack of 
prosecution by order of this Court on June 9, 1987. 
Before addressing the issue of jurisdiction it is important 
to note that there is no transcript of the May 1986 hearing. 
Rawlings refers to continuing objections to jurisdiction made at 
the May hearing. There is no record of these objections as 
Rawlings requested no transcript. As held in Fackrell v. 
Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987): 
Appellate review of factual matters can be 
meaningful, orderly, and intelligent only 
in juxtaposition to a record by which 
lower courts* rulings and decisions on 
disputes can be measured. In this case 
without a transcript no such record wag 
available, and therefore no measurement of 
the district court's action can be made as 
urged upon us by defendant. 
Id. at 1319-20 (quoting Sawyers v. Sawyers, 558 P.2d 607, 608-09 
(Utah 1976)). Without "adequate citations to the record, the 
judgment of the lower court is presumed to be correct." 
Fackrell, 740 P.2d at 1319. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1987) provides: 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to 
make subsequent changes or new orders for 
the support and maintenance of the 
parties, the custody of the children and 
their support, maintenance, health, and 
dental care, or the distribution of the 
property as is reasonable and necessary. 
This statute establishes continuing jurisdiction in the First 
District Court of Box Elder County as the court granting the 
decree of divorce. Rawlings argues that notwithstanding the 
continuing jurisdiction, under the Utah UCCJA, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-45C-1 to 26 (1987), this state is an inconvenient forum. 
Section 78-45c-3(l) states: 
A court of this state which is competent 
to decide child custody matters has 
jurisdiction to make a child custody 
determination by initial or modification 
decree if the conditions as set forth in 
any of the following paragraphs are met: 
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(a) This state (i) is the home state of 
the chijld at the time of commencement 
of the proceeding, or (ii) had been 
the child's home state within six 
months before commencement of the 
proceeding and the child is absent 
from this state because of his 
removal or retention by a person 
claiming his custody or for other 
reasons, and a parent or person 
acting as parent continues to live in 
this state; 
(b) It is in the best interest of the 
child that a court of this state 
assume jurisdiction because (i) the 
child and his parents, or the child 
and at least one contestant, have a 
significant connection with this 
state, and (ii) there is available in 
this state substantial evidence 
concerning the child's present or 
future care, protection, training, 
and personal relationships; 
(c) The child is physically present in 
this state and (i) the child has been 
abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in 
an emergency to protect the child 
because he has been subjected to or 
threatened with mistreatment or abuse 
or is otherwise neglected or 
dependent; or 
(d) (i) It appears that no other state 
would have jurisdiction under 
prerequisites substantially in 
accordance with Paragraphs (a), (b), 
or (c), or another state has declined 
to exercise jurisdiction on the 
ground that this state is the more 
appropriate forum to determine the 
custody of the child, and (ii) it is 
in the best interest of the child 
that this court assume jurisdiction. 
Section 78-45c-3(3) states: 
Physical presence of the child, while 
desirable, is not a prerequisite for 
jurisdiction to determine his custody. 
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Section 78-45c-7(3) states: 
In determining if it is an 
inconvenient forum, the court shall 
consider if it is in the interest of 
the child that another state assume 
jurisdiction. For this purpose it 
may take into account the following 
factors, among others: 
(a) if another state is or recently was 
the child's home state; 
(b) if another state has a closer 
connection with the child and his 
family or with the child and one or 
more of the contestants; 
(c) if substantial evidence concerning 
the child's present or future care, 
protection, training, and personal 
relationships is more readily 
available in another state; 
(d) if the parties have agreed on another 
forum which is no less appropriate; 
and 
(e) if the exercise of jurisdiction by a 
court of this state would contravene 
any of the purposes stated in 
§ 78-45C-1. 
The UCCJA does not mandate loss of jurisdiction to the 
original state in all cases. Only if Utah chooses to 
relinquish jurisdiction, based on the best interests of the 
children, will such jurisdiction transfer.4 In Trent v. 
Trent, 735 P.2d 382 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed the trial court's authority under the Utah UCCJA in 
declining to relinquish jurisdiction to Idaho. In Trent the 
4. It may be argued that jurisdiction may be obtained through 
the emergency provision in section 78-45c-3(l)(c) as was done in 
this case. However, accepting such jurisdiction on an emergency 
basis does not give permanent jurisdiction. The court is still 
required to contact the original state court to determine which 
court is most convenient and best serves the interests of the 
children and the parties. 
860274-CA 5 
children had neither lived in nor had any contacts with the 
State of Utah, unlike the children in this case. While Trent 
dealt exclusively with enforcement of visitation, it makes 
clear that the UCCJA is not mandatory. 
The facts show that Washington specifically declined to 
exercise jurisdiction because of Utah's past and present 
involvement with the matter. The judge in Utah and 
commissioner in Washington conferred and determined that Utah 
was the more appropriate forum and that Utah would continue to 
have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the custody and 
visitation of the parties' children. This is precisely the 
position described in section 78-45c-3(l)(d)(i).5 We hold 
that the First District Court appropriately retained 
jurisdiction under the Utah UCCJA to make any determinations 
regarding custody, visitation or other matters relevant to the 
children. 
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
BENCH, Judge: (Concurring) 
For me, the instant case presents a very narrow question: 
How does a state's continuing jurisdiction in a divorce case 
mesh with foreign jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), 9 U.L.A. 116 (1979)? I believe the 
5. Section 78-45c-3(l)(d)(i) is the same version as used by 
Judge Call in December 1985. 
860274-CA 6 
question is answered by section 14(1) of UCCJA,1 which was 
not mentioned by the majority but provides as follows: 
If a court of another state has made 
a custody decree, a court of this state 
shall not modify that decree unless (a) it 
appears to the court of this state that 
the court which rendered the decree does 
not now have jurisdiction under 
jurisdictional prerequisites substantially 
in accordance with this act or has 
declined to assume jurisdiction to modify 
the decree and (b) the court of this state 
has jurisdiction. 
The Commissioner's note to section 14 explains the 
circumstances under which jurisdiction would shift: 
Courts which render a custody decree 
normally retain continuing jurisdiction to 
modify the decree under local law. Courts 
in other states have in the past often 
assumed jurisdiction to modify the 
out-of-state decree themselves without 
regard to the preexisting jurisdiction of 
the other state. In order to achieve 
greater stability of custody arrangements 
and avoid forum shopping, subsection (a) 
declares that other states will defer to 
the continuing jurisdiction of the court 
of another state as long as that state has 
jurisdiction under the standards of this 
Act. In other words, all petitions for 
modification are to be addressed to the 
prior state if that state has sufficient 
contact with the case to satisfy section 
3. The fact that the court had previously 
considered the case may be one factor 
favoring its continued jurisdiction. If, 
however, all the persons involved have 
moved away or the contact with the state 
has otherwise become slight, modification 
jurisdiction would shift elsewhere. 
1. In Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-14(l) (1987); in 
Washington, RCWA 26.27.140 (1986). 
860274-CA 7 
9 U.L.A. at 154 (citation omitted). 
The Reporter for the Special Committee preparing the UCCJA 
was even more specific when she noted the following: 
A typical example is the case of the 
couple who are divorced in state A, their 
matrimonial home state, and whose children 
are awarded to the wife, subject to 
visitation rights of the husband. Wife 
and children move to state B, with or 
without permission of the court to remove 
the children. State A has continuing 
jurisdiction and the courts in state B may 
not hear the wife's petition to make her 
the sole custodian, eliminate visitation 
rights, or make any other modification of 
the decree, even though state B has in the 
meantime become the "home stateM under 
section 3. The jurisdiction of state A 
continues and is exclusive as long as the 
husband lives in state A unless he loses 
contact with the children, for example, by 
not using his visitation privileges for 
three years. 
Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A 
Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 
22 Vand. L. Rev. 1207, 1237 (1969) (quoted in State ex rel. 
Cooper v, Hamilton, 688 S.W.2d 821, 826 (Tenn. 1985)). 
Under the facts of this case, Utah's jurisdiction over 
custody issues was primary and Washington's jurisdiction was 
secondary. The parties were divorced in Utah. Rawlings 
subsequently moved to Washington, taking the children with 
her. Weiner remained in Utah, and continually sought 
enforcement of his visitation rights under the Utah decree. At 
Rawlings* request, Washington took emergency jurisdiction under 
UCCJA. On discovering that Utah had continuing jurisdiction 
over custody, Washington declined any further jurisdiction 
under section 14(1). That was precisely what should have 
happened under UCCJA. Because Utah had primary jurisdiction 
over custody of the children, I concur in affirming the 
judgment of the trial court. 
Russell W. Bench, JiSjge^5^7^-^ 
860274-CA 8 
Stephen W. Jewell 3814 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
First Security Bldg., Third Floor 
15 South Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN 
RAWLINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK DOUGLAS WEINER, 
Defendant, 
ORDER ON ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE 
Civil No. 16868 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
on May 21, 22, and 26, 1986, the Honorable Omer J. Call 
presiding. The Plaintiff appeared personally and by and 
through her attorney, Stephen W. Jewell. The Defendant 
appeared personally. The Court having heard sworn testimony 
and evidence and having reviewed the pleadings on file herein 
and the Exhibits presented, including the information from the 
Washington Shelter Care proceedings, and having heard the 
arguments of Plaintiff's counsel and Defendant, and having 
heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, and good cause appearing therefore, now enters the 
following: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: :
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1. Plaintiff shall be and is hereby held in contempt of 
Court for failing to comply with the previous order of the 
Court to discontinue the use of the Rawlings name for the 
children. 
2. The name of the children is Werner and there shall 
be no use by the Plaintiff of the Rawlings' name as the last 
name of the children, either for sc,hool records, .medical ' ;J * Z^L 
records, or otherwise. /^^aUai^^ yv^+£ifi,<J **c *-J*£<*<.* r^-l *w-*~e ^JL*^JL^^ fcv 
3. The reports of Bx-»-^ aiXiQt.t CUTT^T" ^r^ij Dr. Jack \!z3^ 
Reiter shall be presented to all current mental health care 
providers for their review and consideration. 
4. Counseling and therapy as ordered by this Court and 
by the Washington Court shall be resumed with Dr. Marilyn 
Eshelman or such other qualified mental health care provider 
as determined by Plaintiff and therapy shall be continued with 
Dr. Tom Fairbank for Defendant. The Court specifically orders 
that once said mental health care provider is selected by 
Plaintiff, there shall be no change of therapists without an 
order of the Court. Therapy will continue until terminated by 
the Court on the recommendation of the therapists. Should the 
therapist become unavailable or desire to terminate the 
relationship, Plaintiff shall immediately thereafter petition 
the Court for removal thereof and appointment of another 
mental health therapist. 
-A22- 4,3 
5. All mail sent by Defendant or Plaintiff to the 
children shall be received by Plaintiff or Defendant and 
deliveredAto the children, whether said mail is sent first 
class or registered. 
6. Each party shall provide the other party and the 
Court with a current and regularly updated home phone number 
and address. During visitation, Defendant shall reasonably 
inform Plaintiff of the whereabouts of the children and shall 
provide an address and telephone number where the children can 
be reached. 
7. There shall be no monitoring of telephone calls or 
other recording of conversations or video tapingAi <-
8. It is the order of the Court that telephone 
conversations need be no longer than ten (10) to twenty (20) ?' r f 
.
 + . bur z!\*(l **i :?. stitrw*. f^^u dyPk^rrf' 
minutes long. J ' ' 
9. Legal custody of the minor children of the parties 
shall be jointly vested in each of the parties, with Plaintiff 
being granted primary physical custody of the children with 
visitation to Defendant as herein provided. 
10. Defendant shall be granted visitation with the 
children as follows, recognizing that visitation is for the 
chidren, and their needs are of primary importance in 
determining visitation arrangements: 
A. During the children's school summer vacation, 
Defendant shall be entitled to six (6) continuous 
-A2 3- 14$ 
weeks. For 1986 said visitation shall begin^on 
June 22 for six (6) weeks, on June 29 for six 
(6) weeks, on July 6 for six (6) weeks, or on 
July 13 for six (6) weeks at the discretion of 
Plaintiff. Plaintiff shall notify the Defendant 
June 1, 1986, by registered mail, when said 
visitation shall begin, and on each year 
thereafter on or before June 1. Said 
visitation to be scheduled in future years 
shall substantially comply with the order 
as as stated above. Said six, (6) weeks 
visitation shall begin f^mri-^ n/ yat 5:00 p.m., 
and continue for six (6) weeks to the sixth 
SfH^y. at 5:00 p.m. 
During said six (6) week visitation, Plaintiff 
shall be granted at least weekly telephone 
conversations with each of the children and 
shall be allowed visitation for at leas* two 
(2) weekends, beginning Friday at 5:00 p.m., 
to Sunday at 5:00 p.m. Plaintiff shall notify 
Defendant of the visitation schedule or. or 
before June 1, 1986, and subsequent years, by 
registered mail. Said visitation may be 
exercised by Plaintiff u^_J^u-^^u^x-vii LL>, ^ *gf!T*u^ Ll 
and the children 
shall be picked up and returned to 
^SS^f with no other restrictions except as 
stated herein. 
C) 
Defendant shall be allowed further visitation 
of four to five (4 to 5) days during the 
children's school Easter vacation in the 
spring and three to four (3 to 4) days during 
October or November as is allowed by the 
children's school vacation as scheduled, not 
to include Thanksgiving. Plaintiff shall notify 
Defendant of the dates and times such visitation 
shall take place by registered mail at least 
sixty (60) days prior to said visitation, or 
when the school schedule is available. Said 
visitation shall m no way interfere with 
regularly scheduled school. 
Thanksgiving and Christmas visitation shall 
continue as provided in previous orders of the 
Court. 
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11. Travel expenses for all visitation, including 
picking up the children in Washington and returning them to 
Washington for the summer visitation, shall be the 
responsibility of Defendant. Defendant shall be entitled to 
deduct from child support payments a total of S300.00 per year 
for all visitation and travel expenses. If Plaintiff delivers 
the children to Brigham City and picks up the children from 
Brigham City for any visitation, Defendant shall be entitled 
to deduct only $200.00 for total travel expenses rather than 
$300. 00. Defendant shall continue to be allowed to reduce 
child support obligations by 3400.00 during summer visitation. 
12. There shall be no other changes in child support 
paid by Defendant except as ordered for travel expenses. 
13. All repeated conflict and emotional distress and 
strain shall be discontinued by the parties. 
14. No police officers or other individuals shall 
intervene or otherwise be used to force compliance with this 
order. Washington Social Services or such other qualified 
agency shall be allowed to assist in compelling compliance of 
the Court order if deemed reasonably necessary by such agency 
after a proper review. The Court will allow reasonable 
exclusions from visitation for illness if any such child is 
isolated because of said illness or upon a doctor's 
certification. 
5 
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15. Defendant shall continue to be responsible for and 
maintain health insurance coverage for the children. If 
Plaintiff desires to obtain medical insurance and provide 
insurance and health care coverage, Plaintiff is allowed to 
provide the same at her own expense. If Plaintiff so elects, 
she shall inform the Defendant thereof in writing and 
Defendant shall thereafter be relieved of further duty and 
obligation to provide health insurance or medical coverage. 
IS. Neither of the parties shall be allowed to recover 
for costs and expenses in this action, whether travel, 
medical, legal or otherwise, and each party shall bear his or 
her own costs and expenses incurred in this action and prior 
hereto. 
17. All other requests and motions of Defendant except 
as herein specifically provided shall be and are hereby 
denied. 
20. All other orders of the Court as previously entered 
and not modified by this order shall stand as otherwise 
provided. 
Confirmed copies mailed this dare 
:o Stephen W# Jewell and Mark 
3. Weiner by: 
>/7^W dl 7/V^^A. 
MaryyC. Holmgren-Deputy 
3Y THE COURT 
Cmer J. Cali^ 
District Judge 
6 
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNT! 
WENDY MARIE 
MARK 
v.. 
DOUGLAS 
CHRISTENSEN RAWLINGSf ) 
WEINER, 
Petitioner, ) 
Respondent. ) 
NO. 85-3-04844-3 
ORDER DECLINING 
JURISDICTION 
Petitioner's motion for determination of jurisdiction and 
communication with Box Elder County District Court having duly 
and regularly come on for hearing, the same being referred to 
the undersigned commissioner who had presided over contemporane 
ous Juvenile Court proceedings concerning the custody of the 
children subject of this proceeding and retained jurisdiction 
therein; the court having further communicated with the appropr 
ate judge of Bex Elder County District Court; now therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this court 
finds that the custody and visitation of the children subject t 
this proceeding has also been subject to the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the 3ox Elder County District Court of the Stat 
of Utah; that said court acquired jurisdiction over the parries 
and the subject matter several years ago and has continuously,-, 
exercised jurisdiction in enforcement and modification proceed-
ings; and that one of the named parties, father ofAHhechiadrei 
ORDER - 1 70 -,' (, 
-A6- ' '• ' 
continues to reside in the State of Utah; that upon communica-
tion with said court it has elected and determined to continue 
exercising sole and exclusive child custody jurisdiction; and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act (RCW 26.27) it is determined that Box 
Elder County District Court of the State of Utah continues to 
have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the custody and 
visitation of the parties1 children, the parties not having 
agreed to litigate exclusively in the State of Washington and 
there being no emergency justifying intervention in the matter 
by Washington Courts; and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all Washington proceedings con-
cerning the custody of said children are hereby stayed until 
further order of the court or until an appropriate motion for 
dismissal proceedings is filed and granted; and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the courts of Washington and this 
proceeding shall remain open for enforcement provisions of such 
orders as have been and may be entered by the Box Elder County 
District Court of the State of Utah pursuant to the provisions of 
the UCCJA. 
Dated and signed in open this -^  of January, 1986 
STEPHEN M. GADDIS, COURT COMMISSIONER 
ORDER - 2 _a7_ 
78-45c~l. Purposes - Construction. 
(1) The general purposes of this act are to: 
(a) Avoid jurisdiction competition and conflict with 
courts of other states in matters of child custody which have 
in the past resulted in the shifting of children from state 
to state with harmful effects on their well-being; 
(b) Promote cooperation with the courts of other states 
to the end that a custody decree is rendered in that state 
which can best decide the case in the interest of the child; 
(c) Assure that litigation concerning the custody of a 
child take place ordinarily in the state with which the child 
and his family have the closest connection and where 
significant evidence concerning his care, protection, 
training, and personal relationships is most readily 
available, and that court of this state decline the exercise 
of jurisdiction when the child and his family have a closer 
connection with another state; 
(d) Discourage continuing controversies over child 
custody in the interest of greater stability of home 
environment and of secure family relationships for the child; 
(e) Deter abductions and other unilateral removals of 
children undertaken to obtain custody awards; 
(f) Avoid relitigation of custody decisions of other 
states in this state insofar as feasible; 
(g) Facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of 
other states; 
(h) Promote and expand the exchange of information and 
other forms of mutual assistance between the courts of this 
state and those of other states concerned with the same 
child; and 
(i) To make uniform the law of those states which enact 
it. 
(2) This title shall be construed to promote the general 
purposes stated in this section. 
78-45c-2. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Contestant" means a person, including a parent, 
who 
claims a right to custody or visitation rights with respect 
to a child; 
(2) "Custody determination" means a court decision and 
court orders and instructions providing for the custody of a 
child, including visitation rights; it does not include a 
decision relating to child support or any other monetary 
obligation of any person; 
(3) "Custody proceeding" includes proceedings in which 
a custody determination is one of several issues, such as an 
action for dissolution of marriage, or legal separation and 
includes child neglect and dependency proceedings; 
(4) "Decree" or "custody decree" means a custody 
determination contained in a judicial decree or order made in 
a custody proceeding, and includes an initial decree and a 
modification decree; 
(5) "Home state" means the state in which the child 
immediately preceding the time involved lived with his 
parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least 
six consecutive months, and in the case of a child less than 
six months old the state in which the child lived from birth 
with any of the persons mentioned. Periods of temporary 
absence of any of the named persons are counted as part of 
the six-month or other period; 
(6) "Initial decree" means the first custody decree 
concerning a particular child; 
(7) "Modification decree" means a custody decree which 
modifies or replaces a prior decree, whether made by the 
court which rendered the prior decree or by another court; 
(8) "Physical custody" means actual possession and 
control of a child; 
(9) "Person acting as parent" means a person, other 
than a parent, who has physical custody of a child and who 
has either been awarded custody by the court or claims a 
right to custody; and 
(10) "State" means any state, territory or possession of 
the United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the 
District of Columbia. 
78-45c-3. Bases of jurisdiction in this state• 
(1) A court of this state which is competent to decide 
child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child 
custody determination by initial or modification decree if 
the conditions as set forth in any of the following 
paragraphs are met: 
(a) This state (i) is the home state of the child at 
the time of commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been 
the child's home state within six months before commencement 
of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state 
because of his removal or retention by a person claiming his 
custody or for other reasons, and a parent or person acting 
as parent continues to live in this state; 
(b) It is in the best interest of the child that a 
court of this state assume jurisdiction because (i) the child 
and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant, 
have a significant connection with this state, and (ii) there 
is available in this state substantial evidence concerning 
the child's present or future care, protection, training, and 
personal relationships; 
(c) The child is physically present in this state and 
(i) the child has been abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in 
an emergency to protect the child because he has been 
subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is 
otherwise neglected or dependent; or 
(d)(i) It appears that no other state would have 
jurisdiction under prerequisites substantial in accordance 
with paragraphs (a), (b), or (c), or another state has 
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this 
state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody 
of the child, and (ii) it is in the best interest of the 
child that this court assume jurisdiction. 
(2) Except under paragraphs (c) and (d) of subsection 
(1)/ physical presence in this state of the child, or of the 
child and one of the contestants, is not alone sufficient to 
confer jurisdiction on a court of this state to make a child 
custody determination. 
(3) Physical presence of the child, while desireable, is 
not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to determine his custody. 
78-45c-4. Persons to be notified and heard. 
Before making a decree under this act, reasonable notice 
and opportunity to be heard shall be given to the 
contestants, any parent whose parental rights have not been 
previously terminated, and any person who has physical 
custody of the child. If any of these persons is outside 
this state, notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given 
pursuant to section 78-45c-5. 
78-45c-5. Service of notice outside state - Proof of service 
- Submission to jurisdiction. 
(1) Notice required for the exercise of jurisdiction over 
a person outside this state shall be given in a manner 
reasonably calculated to give actual notice, and may be made 
in any of the following ways: 
(a) By personal delivery outside this state in the 
manner prescribed for service of process within this state; 
(b) In the manner prescribed by the law of the place in 
which the service is made for service of process in that 
place in an action in any of its courts of general 
jurisdiction; 
(c) By any form of mail addressed to the person to be 
served and requesting a receipt; or 
(d) As directed by the court (including publication, if 
other means of notification are ineffective). 
(2) Notice under this section shall be served, mailed, 
delivered, or last published at least 10 days before any 
hearing in this state. 
(3) Proof of service outside this state may be made by 
affidavit of the individual who made the service, or in the 
manner prescribed by the law of this state, the order 
pursuant to which the service is made, or the law of the 
place in which the service is made. If service is made by 
mail, proof may be a receipt signed by the addressee or other 
evidence of delivery to the addressee. 
(4) Notice is not required if a person submits to the 
jurisdiction of the court. 
78-45c-6. Proceedings pending elsewhere- Jurisdiction not 
exercised - Inquiry to other state - Information exchange 
-Stay of proceeding on notice of another proceeding. 
(1) A court of this state shall not exercise its 
jurisdiction under this act if at the time of filing the 
petition a proceeding concerning the custody of the child was 
pending in a court of another state exercising jurisdiction 
substantially in conformity with this act, unless the 
proceeding is stayed by the court of the other state because 
this state is a more appropriate forum or for other reasons. 
(2) Before hearing the petition in a custody proceeding 
the court shall examine the pleadings and other information 
supplied by the parties under section 78~45c~10 and shall 
consult the child custody registry established under section 
78-45c-16 concerning the pendency of proceedings with respect 
to the child in other states. If the court has reason to 
believe that proceedings may be pending in another state it 
shall direct an inquiry to the state court administrator or 
other appropriate official of the other state. 
(3) If the court is informed during the course of the 
proceeding that a proceeding concerning the custody of the 
child was pending in another state before the court assumed 
jurisdiction it shall stay the proceeding and communicate 
with the court in which the other proceeding is pending to 
the end that the issue may be litigated in the more 
appropriate forum and that information be exchanged in 
accordance with sections 78-45c-19 through 78-45c-22. If a 
court of this state has made a custody decree before being 
informed of a pending proceeding in a court of another state 
it shall immediately inform that court of the fact. If the 
court is informed that a proceeding was commenced in another 
state after it assumed jurisdiction it shall likewise inform 
the other court to the end that the issues may be litigated 
in the more appropriate forum. 
78-45c-7. Declining jurisdiction on finding of inconvenient 
forum - Factors in determination - Communication with other 
court -Awarding costs• 
(1) A court which has jurisdiction under this act to make 
an initial or modification decree may decline to exercise 
its jurisdiction any time before making a decree if it 
finds that it is an inconvenient forum to make a custody 
determination under the circumstances of the case and that 
a court of another state is a more appropriate forum. 
(2) A finding of inconvenient forum may be made upon the 
court's own motion or upon motion of a party or a guardian ad 
litem or other representative of the child. 
(3) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the 
court shall consider if it is in the interest of the child 
that another state assume jurisdiction. For this purpose it 
may take into account the following factors, among others: 
(a) If another state is or recently was the child's 
home state; 
(b) If another state has a closer connection with the 
child and his family or with the child and one or more of the 
contestants; 
(c) If substantial evidence concerning the child's 
present or future care, protection, training, and personal 
relationships is more readily available in another state; 
(d) If the parties have agreed on another forum which 
is no less appropriate; and 
(e) If the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this 
state would contravene any of the purposes stated in section 
78-45c-l. 
(4) Before determining whether to decline or retain 
jurisdiction the court may communicate with a court of 
another state and exchange information pertinent to the 
assumption of jurisdiction by either court with a view to 
assuring that jurisdiction will be exercised by the more 
appropriate court and that a forum will be available to the 
parties. 
(5) If the court finds that it is an inconvenient forum 
and that a court of another state is a more appropriate 
forum, it may dismiss the proceedings, or it may stay the 
proceedings upon condition that a custody proceeding be 
promptly commenced in another named state or upon any other 
conditions which may be just and proper, including the 
condition that a moving party stipulate his consent and 
submission to the jurisdiction of the other forum. 
(6) The court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction 
under this act if a custody determination is incidental to an 
action for divorce or another proceeding while retaining 
jurisdiction over the divorce or other proceeding. 
(7) If it appears to the court that it is clearly an 
inappropriate forum it may require the party who commenced 
the proceedings to pay, in addition to the costs of the 
proceedings in this state, necessary travel and other 
expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by other 
parties or their witnesses. Payment is to be made to the 
clerk of the court for remittance to the proper party. 
(8) Upon dismissal or stay of proceedings under this 
section the court shall inform the court found to be the more 
appropriate forum of this fact, or if the court which would 
have jurisdiction in the other state is not certainly known, 
shall transmit the information to the court administrator or 
other appropriate official for forwarding to the appropriate 
court. 
(9) Any communication received from another state 
informing this state of a finding of inconvenient forum 
because a court of this state is the more appropriate forum 
shall be filed in the custody registry of the appropriate 
court. Upon assuming jurisdiction the court of this state 
shall inform the original court of this fact. 
30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care 
of parties and children - Court to have continuing 
jurisdiction -Custody and visitation - Termination of 
alimony -Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, 
property, and parties. The court shall include the following 
in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment 
of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of 
the dependent children; and 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an 
order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate 
health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependant 
children. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child 
support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all 
or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. If the court determines 
that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent 
children would be adequately cared for, it may include an 
order allowing the non-custodial parent to provide the day 
care for the dependent children, necessitated by the 
employment or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and 
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children and 
their support, maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental 
care, or the distribution of the property as is reasonable 
and necessary. 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, 
grandparents, and other relatives, the court shall consider 
the welfare of the child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides 
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to 
a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage 
of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is 
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony 
shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to 
the action of annulment and his rights are terminated. 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a 
former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party 
paying alimony that the former spouse is residing with a 
person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further 
established by the person receiving alimony that that 
relationship or association is without any sexual contact, 
payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) When a petition for modification of child custody or 
visitation provisions of a court order is made and denied, 
the court may order the petitioner to pay the reasonable 
attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in that 
action, if the court determines that the petition was without 
merit and not asserted in good faith. 
